자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0016934527

International Standard Book Number  

9798380470742

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

519.93

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Kelley, Mikayla.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : Stanford University., 2023

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023

Physical Description  

1 online resource(104 p.)

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-04, Section: B.

General Note  

Advisor: Bratman, Michael;Peacocke, Antonia;Hussain, Nadeem.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2023.

Restrictions on Access Note  

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Summary, Etc.  

요약A basic distinction through which we understand the world is the distinction between an individual's actions and what merely happens to the individual. Think of the difference between a wink and an eye twitch, a squirrel jumping off a tree and the squirrel falling off the tree, or your moving a boulder and the boulder moving you. This dissertation is an attempt to illustrate the crucial role that control plays in an adequate understanding of the nature of action.The first part of the dissertation (Chapter 2) proposes a theory of action, which I call the control theory of action. The central claim of the theory is that action is movement that is controlled by the mover, where movement is understood capaciously and control is characterized by a trio of conditions consisting of an aim condition, a modal condition, and an explanatory condition. Importantly, being controlled is shown to be a determinable property of movements, and its determination dimensions are isolated. Paired with the claim that action is movement that is controlled by the mover, this account of control as a determinable illuminates the diversity within the category of action.The second part of the dissertation (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) uses the control theory of action to answer a number of perennial questions regarding the nature of intentional action, the kind of action which has been a focus of contemporary philosophy of action, thereby exemplifying the fecundity of the theory. I attend first to the relationship between intentional action, knowledge, and ethics from the perspective of the control theory of action. I argue that contrary to a prominent tradition within action theory, there are no necessary connections between intentional action and knowledge (Chapter 3). This is because there is a disparate influence from ethics on the threshold of sufficient control governing intentional action and the threshold of sufficient warrant governing knowledge. I strengthen this argument by defending a particular constitutive link between intentional action and ethics (Chapter 4), thereby showing that, in a sense, there could be no purely naturalistic theory of intentional action. In particular, I argue that the concept of intentional action plays a functional role in our ethical conceptual scheme of flagging behaviors that are of priority for ethical evaluation broadly construed, and that this functional role, in part, fixes the threshold of sufficient contro required for intentional action.I turn next to the questions of how we take means to intentional action and how, if at all, we perform intentional mental actions (Chapter 5). As I discuss, these questions are related and answering them correctly requires attending to the kind of control which is required for intentional agency. I argue that there is a pluralism of ways we control intentional action, and this pluralism is matched in the pluralism of ways we take means to intentional action. In particular, I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, sometimes the means we take to intentionally acting causes that which it is a means to, as when one intentionally sneezes by looking at the sun or intentionally laughs by bringing to mind a funny joke. Finally, I show that once we make room for such causal means, we are in a better position to vindicate our having a robust capacity for intentional mental agency.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Control theory.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Hair.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Behavior.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Metaphysics.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Human agency.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Ethics.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Morality.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Philosophy.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Systems science.

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

Stanford University.

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-04B.

Host Item Entry  

Dissertation Abstract International

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:642286