자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0017163542

International Standard Book Number  

9798342710220

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

331

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Nevo, Guillaume.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : New York University., 2024

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024

Physical Description  

151 p.

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.

General Note  

Advisor: Menzio, Guido.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.

Summary, Etc.  

요약How do wages and labor market transitions vary with labor market concentration? The first chapter of my dissertation tackles this empirical question using comprehensive French employer employee data. I show that wages increase - contrary to what has been shown in other countries - and transition rates decrease when concentration increases. These results are found in the raw data, in regressions at the labor market level, in panel data regressions and in an event study setting in which I focus on markets undergoing large increase in concentration. The correlations are both robust and economically large - wages increasing by an average of 7% when going from a typical non-concentrated to a typical concentrated labor market.My second chapter focuses on explaining these correlations through the lens of structural model. I propose a simple model of search-and-matching with a discrete number of firms, optimal vacancy posting and a fixed cost of entry. The whole mechanic relies on a productivity selection channel, by which only the most productive firms enter more concentrated labor markets in equilibrium for which entry costs are higher. My model replicates the two main empirical findings of my first chapter: (1) when the entry cost increases, only the most productive firms enter, the market is more concentrated, wages are higher, and transition rates are lower; (2) given a labor market, an increase in productivity at one large firm increases wages at all firms through the increase in output at that firm and in outside option at all other firms, increases transition rates towards that firm, and reduces them towards all other firms. I quantify the markdowns on wages and show they are always relatively small. I investigate the first-best solution in which a planner chooses the distribution of workers across firms to maximize output: the planner concentrates employment among most productive firms, it increases output, mean wage, and total income to workers despite increasing concentration and unemployment. I turn to second-best implementations using individual tax and subsidy rates. By fully taxing most firms - the unproductive ones -, taxing partially the least productive firms among the operating ones, and using the tax revenue collected to subsidize the most productive firms, a planner almost achieves the first-best solution. On the contrary, simple linear tax policies do no come anywhere close to the first-best solution. My third chapter studies the efficiency property and distributional effects of firing costs in a search-and-matching model with active "on-the-job" search by workers and firms. We allow firms to search and replace their workers when finding a better match provided they pay some firing costs. We characterize the transition rules, and bargaining outcomes of all meetings, and numerically solve for the surplus and the equilibrium distribution of workers across matches. When increasing firing costs, low-type workers are high the hardest as firms would rather not hire them than being unable to fire them later. High-type workers benefit from firing costs. Total output can be increased by 1% and unemployment rate reduced by 0.2% by removing all firing costs.

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Efficiency

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Entry

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Firing costs

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Labor market

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Market power

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Wage

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

New York University Economics

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-04A.

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:658544