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Explaining Debt Covenant Amendments: A Structural Approach.
Explaining Debt Covenant Amendments: A Structural Approach.
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문
- Control Number
- 0017160555
- International Standard Book Number
- 9798382830162
- Dewey Decimal Classification Number
- 658
- Main Entry-Personal Name
- Luneva, Irina.
- Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint
- [S.l.] : University of Pennsylvania., 2024
- Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- Physical Description
- 102 p.
- General Note
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
- General Note
- Advisor: Schrand, Catherine M.;Fischer, Paul.
- Dissertation Note
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2024.
- Summary, Etc.
- 요약Financial covenants, which use financial information to determine control rights in corporate loan contracts, are frequently amended (Roberts, 2015). Despite the strong evidence, prior literature has not found an explanation for the high frequency. In this paper, I offer a model of debt covenant amendments and structurally estimate it using novel data on amendments of financial covenants in U.S. companies' loan contracts. The model offers three explanations for why financial covenants get amended: (1) the degree of contractual incompleteness is high, (2) non-contractible information is highly predictive of the future, and (3) the costs of amendments are small, while the costs of misallocating control rights are high. The estimation results mostly support the first and the third explanations. Financial covenants are amended because contracting parties indeed face a high degree of contractual incompleteness, because the costs of amendments are indeed low compared to the costs of misallocating control rights, but not necessarily because non-contractible information is highly predictive of the future.
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Finance.
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Amendments
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Debt contract
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Dynamic contract
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Financial covenants
- Added Entry-Corporate Name
- University of Pennsylvania Accounting
- Host Item Entry
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
- Electronic Location and Access
- 로그인을 한후 보실 수 있는 자료입니다.
- Control Number
- joongbu:658095
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798382830162
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31139718
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a658
■1001 ▼aLuneva, Irina.
■24510▼aExplaining Debt Covenant Amendments: A Structural Approach.
■260 ▼a[S.l.]▼bUniversity of Pennsylvania. ▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a102 p.
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Schrand, Catherine M.;Fischer, Paul.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2024.
■520 ▼aFinancial covenants, which use financial information to determine control rights in corporate loan contracts, are frequently amended (Roberts, 2015). Despite the strong evidence, prior literature has not found an explanation for the high frequency. In this paper, I offer a model of debt covenant amendments and structurally estimate it using novel data on amendments of financial covenants in U.S. companies' loan contracts. The model offers three explanations for why financial covenants get amended: (1) the degree of contractual incompleteness is high, (2) non-contractible information is highly predictive of the future, and (3) the costs of amendments are small, while the costs of misallocating control rights are high. The estimation results mostly support the first and the third explanations. Financial covenants are amended because contracting parties indeed face a high degree of contractual incompleteness, because the costs of amendments are indeed low compared to the costs of misallocating control rights, but not necessarily because non-contractible information is highly predictive of the future.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0175.
■650 4▼aFinance.
■653 ▼aAmendments
■653 ▼aDebt contract
■653 ▼aDynamic contract
■653 ▼aFinancial covenants
■690 ▼a0272
■690 ▼a0508
■71020▼aUniversity of Pennsylvania▼bAccounting.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12A.
■790 ▼a0175
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160555▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
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