Material Type  

 학위논문

 

0017160863

Date and Time of Latest Transaction  

20250211151128

ISBN  

9798382775456

DDC  

320

Author  

Yi, Ruochen.

Title/Author  

Behavior and Incentives of Political Players in Non-Democratic Systems.

Publish Info  

[S.l.] : The University of Chicago., 2024

Publish Info  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024

Material Info  

184 p.

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.

General Note  

Advisor: Durlauf, Steven;Myerson, Roger.

학위논문주기  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2024.

Abstracts/Etc  

요약This dissertation explores the intricate dynamics of political behavior and incentive mechanisms within non-democratic systems, with a focus on China's unique governance structure. It comprises three comprehensive chapters, each addressing distinct yet interrelated aspects of political maneuvering and strategic decision-making by political players.Chapter 1 delves into the manipulation of GDP growth by local Chinese officials, particularly mayors and prefecture Party secretaries, as a strategy for career advancement. Through an extensive analysis of career trajectories for 536 Party secretaries and 583 mayors, this chapter reveals how these officials engage in GDP manipulation at critical junctures in their careers to secure promotions. Employing a game theory model, findings demonstrate that both mayors and secretaries exploit their last opportunity for advancement to positions of real authority by artificially boosting GDP figures. However, this manipulation is met with heightened promotion criteria by higher authorities, particularly for secretaries at pivotal ages who must exceed average GDP growth rates significantly to be considered for promotion. Interestingly, the presence of mayors poised to succeed them acts as a deterrent against secretaries' short-sighted economic policies, suggesting a complex interplay that favors long-term development over immediate gains.Chapter 2 investigates the survival strategies of governments facing threats from various actors with divergent interests. It posits that strategic institution building, which initially disadvantages and later empowers certain challengers, can delay rebellions. This nuanced approach to managing political dissent and conflict highlights the importance of timing in the transition of institutional power, providing insights into the economic and political evolution observed in China. The government's manipulation of perceived benefits to delay potential uprisings underscores the delicate balance between short-term survival and long-term stability.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Public policy.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Political science.

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Career advancement

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Diarchy

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Government survival

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Land market auctions

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Non-revenue-maximizing incentives

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Transition timing

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

The University of Chicago Public Policy Studies

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:657616