자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0017161568

International Standard Book Number  

9798382760964

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

658

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Bayas-Erazo, Matias.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : Northwestern University., 2024

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024

Physical Description  

162 p.

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.

General Note  

Advisor: Angeletos, George-Marios;Lorenzoni, Guido.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2024.

Summary, Etc.  

요약This thesis includes three essays in macroeconomics and fiscal policy. Chapter 1 studies how the optimal mix of debt and redistributive taxation depends on social preferences for redistribution. I consider a standard heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets economy where public debt provides liquidity and helps agents self-insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Redistributive taxation is distortionary but also acts as a form of social insurance due to market incompleteness. I solve for the limiting steady state of the fully dynamic optimal policy problem for this economy. I show that planners with stronger preferences for redistribution implement more progressive tax systems, as one would expect. But, perhaps surprisingly, they also favor lower levels of public debt. This property of the optimal mix is robust to a number of extensions to the baseline environment and is mainly due to a novel interest rate channel: redistributive taxation reduces the need to self-insure and thus makes government borrowing less attractive.Chapter 2 is the product of joint work with George-Marios Angeletos. We study the implications of rationally inattentive behavior for the design of optimal taxes. Our main finding is an irrelevance result: when inattention satisfies two key properties, invariance and state separability, optimal taxes satisfy exactly the same type of sufficient-statistics formula as that found in classical public finance. Away from this benchmark, inattention can lead to novel considerations for the design of optimal taxes. First, some forms of inattention may generate interdependences across states. Second, departures from invariance may call for simplifying the tax system. Finally, we clarify that inattention does not necessarily make agents less responsive and may thus call for lower taxes.Chapter 3 is the product of joint work with Fergal Hanks and analyzes the joint dynamics of labour and capital in economies with heterogeneous firms. We develop a model of lumpy capital adjustment with frictional hiring that helps resolve the tension between existing models of investment and the latest microeconomic evidence on capital and labor adjustment. Unlike existing models of investment, our model is consistent with the well-documented lumpiness of firm investment at the micro level and the responsiveness of investment to changes in the cost of capital. Finally, we provide evidence that supports frictional hiring and study the aggregate dynamics of lumpy investment models with frictional hiring.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Finance.

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Macroeconomics

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Fiscal policy

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Optimal taxes

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

Northwestern University Economics

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-11A.

Electronic Location and Access  

로그인을 한후 보실 수 있는 자료입니다.

Control Number  

joongbu:657317