자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0017163015

International Standard Book Number  

9798384050612

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

368

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Feng, Yujie.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : Cornell University., 2024

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024

Physical Description  

160 p.

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.

General Note  

Advisor: Waldman, Michael.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cornell University, 2024.

Summary, Etc.  

요약This dissertation is a collection of three independent essays on healthcare and insurance economics. Chapter 1 examines the impact of price transparency on healthcare prices. Using a natural experiment involving the gradual disclosure of medical procedure prices on a state-run website, this paper finds a significant decrease in the allowed amount for medical visits across surgical, radiology, and lab procedure categories, indicating that the price information website causally decreased procedure prices. Examining the mechanisms behind this reduction shows that both patient sorting, as individuals increasingly choose lower-cost providers, and bargaining effects, as providers and insurers negotiate lower allowed amounts, contribute to the overall reduction in the allowed amount. The dominant effect of price transparency in reducing healthcare prices, however, is the bargaining effect. Despite the reduction in allowed amount, this paper finds no significant reduction in price dispersion after price disclosure.Chapter 2 studies the effect of price reduction in the durable medical equipment (DME) market. Given the substantial healthcare expenditures in the U.S., there have been proposals to lower the prices of medical supplies. However, these policies often face strong opposition from the industry, asserting that reduced prices might diminish suppliers' incentives to sell and produce, ultimately jeopardizing patients' access to these supplies. In this paper, I leverage a natural experiment in 2016 when CMS extended prices from the competitive bidding program nationwide, causing a significant price drop in specific DMEs. While the price reduction decreased average Medicare costs for DMEs, there was also a substantial decrease in the number of fulfilled claims. My paper finds a decline in available local suppliers for the affected products post-price reduction, potentially contributing to the reduction in fulfilled claims despite the lower costs.Chapter 3 studies the decision to purchase auto insurance liability coverage in a large sample of nearly 370,000 households. Unlike deductible insurance, liability coverage involves large stakes because even the most generous policies can leave customers exposed to potentially unbounded risks. We use data on firm payouts for claims to estimate the underlying distribution of losses under liability coverage. Our analysis reveals that the standard expected utility model alone fails to fully explain households' choices in our dataset. Contrary to model predictions, we find instances where households opt for dominated options. Furthermore, the standard model suggests that households exhibit extreme risk aversion, consistent with Rabin's classic argument. We augment a standard expected utility model with limited consideration and find that the model achieves excellent fit to the choice data. We show that our limited consideration parameters are correlated with household characteristics and other macroeconomic conditions in intuitive ways, indicating that limited consideration can be used to connect key economic variables to consumers' behavior.

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Insurance economics

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Durable medical equipment

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Healthcare prices

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

Cornell University Economics

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-03B.

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:657103