자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0017162021

International Standard Book Number  

9798382778020

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

658

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Fabrizi, Domenico.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : University of California, Los Angeles., 2024

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024

Physical Description  

121 p.

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.

General Note  

Advisor: Asker, John William.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2024.

Summary, Etc.  

요약In this dissertation, I analyze how different selling mechanisms affect welfare. This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapters 1 and 2, I empirically study upgrades - fees that customers pay to access a premium quality product after the purchase of a regular one - and how they affect consumers. On one hand, upgrades might benefit consumers as they allow the purchase of higher-quality goods at a discounted price. On the other hand, the monopolist will seek to capture surplus from these gains from trade by offering a different price menu for all goods. Whether consumer welfare will rise or fall when a monopolist introduces upgrades will depend on the relative magnitudes of these two effects. I disentangle these two effects in the context of an international airline that gives economy class passengers the option to pay an additional fee to upgrade to business class. In Chapter 1, I describe the data and show how the airline uses upgrades. In Chapter 2, I develop and estimate a model of airline pricing in order to assess the effects of upgrades via counterfactual simulations. I show that the upgrade option improves the allocation of passengers among cabins over time and increases consumer and producer welfare by 1.5% and 2% respectively. In Chapter 3, I theoretically study auctions with budget constraints and I compare first price and second price auctions. I show that endowing bidders with the same and commonly known financial constraints reduces seller's revenues, however, this decrease is larger in second price auctions than in first price auctions.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Finance.

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Industrial organizations

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Welfare

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Selling mechanisms

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Customers pay

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Airline pricing

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

University of California, Los Angeles Economics 0246

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12B.

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:657006