자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0017162600

International Standard Book Number  

9798383193983

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

370

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Morales Cerda, Matias.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : New York University., 2024

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024

Physical Description  

119 p.

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01, Section: A.

General Note  

Advisor: Dehejia, Rajeev.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.

Summary, Etc.  

요약This dissertation presents a collection of three essays on Economics of Education. The first essay in Chapter 1 studies what are the consequences for students that switch schools, and what drives their decision to do so in the context of Chile's school choice system. It proposes a puzzle of three pieces: first, students do not react to changes in the relative quality of schools by switching, despite their ability to do so every year; second, the consequences of switching schools voluntarily are at least non-negative; and third, turnover at the school-level has only mild externalities on students that do not switch schools.Then, the essay explores to what extent inertia in families' preferences for schools can explain the lack of switching. It does so by estimating a demand for schools incorporating a switching cost that captures the unwillingness of families to leave their schools, after considering changes in the attributes across schools and over time. I allow for two sources of inertia: one stemming from the cost of seeking information on new schools, and another stemming from all other reasons that might deter families from switching, such as leaving school communities behind, that I call a fixed cost.I find that families are willing to pay the information cost only if to move from a school in the median of the cognitive test score distribution to one in the 75th percentile. Then, to make progress in disentangling the components of the fixed cost, I collect information on a random sample of Chilean parents on their reasons to not switch schools. I find that the presence of friends and specific teachers are also strong sources of inertia and deter families from switching schools. I show suggestive evidence that this inertia turns the demand for schools -to some extent- captive, which in turn dilutes the incentives for schools to compete against each other, thus providing lower value added than if faced stronger competition.The second essay in Chapter 2 answers two questions. First, is there any negative effect on academic performance arising from studying in a school which student body is socioeconomically disadvantaged? The answer to this question is yes, and I arrive to it by comparing the outcomes of students within the same schools but attending different grade levels, with different shares of disadvantaged students. This approach allows me to isolate the effect of peers from that of school inputs and give a causal interpretation to my results. I find that for each additional percentage point in the share of disadvantaged students, test scores fall by around 0.0013 SD, depending on students' (dis)advantage status and the test subject. Moreover, descriptive evidence indicates that the effect is highly nonlinear, as the effect grows with the disadvantaged students concentration.Then, the second question is: can a program targeting additional resources to schools with high shares of disadvantaged students offset the former effect? The answer is a categorical no. I arrive to this conclusion taking advantage of the architecture of the program, which allocates additional resources in a discontinuous way. This allows me to employ an RDD estimation and compare schools that are observably similar, but that face different budgets. To understand the puzzling conclusion, I collect data on several school inputs, and I find that total spending per student, spending on learning resources, and student-to-teacher ratios do not change at the cutoffs stipulated by the policy. The third essay in Chapter 3 is a paper co-authored with Fidel Bennett and Dante Contreras, published in the International Journal of Educational Development. It answers: what is the effect of being expelled from school on the probability of dropping out from the system altogether? Answering such a question is highly policy-relevant, as measures of exclusionary discipline exist across countries. These aim to benefit the school community by excluding problematic students. We find that sanctioned students are 4.8 percentage points more likely to drop out than non- sanctioned students. The consequences of expulsions are particularly harmful for students in public schools, men, retained students, and those meeting the legal working age. Also, immediately expelling a student -as opposed to expelling at the end of the school year- increases the baseline probability of dropout by three times. These costs of exclusionary discipline are not offset by clear gains in academic performance of expelled students' classmates. Taken together, these results call for alternative methods to improve school discipline and strengthen support policies to minimize the harm of expulsions.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Education.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Education policy.

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

School communities

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Public schools

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Chilean parents

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

School discipline

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Problematic students

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

New York University Robert F Wagner Graduate School of Public Service

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-01A.

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:656527