자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0017162192

International Standard Book Number  

9798384198482

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

530.13

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Aybas, Yunus Can.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : Stanford University., 2024

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024

Physical Description  

187 p.

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.

General Note  

Advisor: Jackson, Matthew;Callander, Steven.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2024.

Summary, Etc.  

요약This dissertation comprises three essays in information economics. The central focus of this work is to study how the structure of the informational environment impacts the transmission of information and the resultant effects on outcomes and welfare. The first chapter of this dissertation introduces a new framework for modeling strategic information transmission in complex environments. We identify an equilibrium that is efficient and sender-optimal. The outcome is exactly what the sender would choose if she held full decision-making authority. This contrasts with the canonical simple environment of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which equilibrium outcomes are inefficient and favor the receiver. The second chapter explores how an expert's ability to persuade changes with the availability of messages. We develop a geometric representation of the expert's payoff when using a limited number of messages. We identify bounds on the value of an additional signal for the sender. Moreover, we show that an additional signal does not directly translate into more information in equilibrium, and the receiver might prefer coarse communication. This suggests that regulations on communication capacity have the potential to shift the balance of power from the expert to the decision-maker, ultimately improving welfare. The third chapter deviates from the preceding two by focusing on non-strategic communication. In this chapter, we introduce a model in which homophily affects both the quality and diversity of the information to which people have access in their social networks. We characterize conditions under which homophily hurts rather than helps social learning. Homophily lowers efficiency and increases inequality in sparse networks but enhances efficiency and decreases inequality in dense enough networks. We also show that optimal (learning-maximizing) networks exhibit assortativity in payoff-determining characteristics, which results in incidental homophily on other innate characteristics, providing an explanation for some empirical patterns.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Brownian motion.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Communication.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Power.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Decision making.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Empowerment.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Natural language.

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

Stanford University.

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-03A.

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:655231