자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0016934528

International Standard Book Number  

9798380483971

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

301.426

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Zhang, Sally.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : Stanford University., 2023

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023

Physical Description  

1 online resource(143 p.)

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-04, Section: A.

General Note  

Advisor: Pistaferri, Luigi;Voena, Alessandra;Morten, Melanie.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2023.

Restrictions on Access Note  

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Summary, Etc.  

요약Understanding household decisions is crucial for promoting gender equality and economic development. First, individuals in developing countries, especially women, spend more of their lives married. According to UN estimates (2018), 23% of women in the least developed countries are already married by age 19, compared to 3% of women in developed countries. Second, women and children are more likely to be poor than men, even after controlling for total household income (Dunbar et al. 2013). To lift women and children out of poverty, we must first understand the roots of unequal distribution in the household. Lastly, policymakers need to make informed choices that affect intrahousehold dynamics. From the identity of beneficiaries to information disseminated, every policy makes implicit assumptions on household decision-making. Understanding how households make decisions can improve the targeting of anti-poverty programs, reduce poverty of women and children, and promote equitable gender norms.What matters for intrahousehold allocation and the welfare of its members? Empirically, a large literature has proposed that increasing the amount of income controlled by women can increase their bargaining power and improve child development outcomes (e.g. Duflo 2003). Building on this literature, I show that in addition to the amount of income, the observability and the sourceof one's income also affect household decision-making and investment in children. That is, not all incomes are created equal.The first two chapters of my dissertation study the role of asymmetric information and unobservable income in household allocation. In many developing countries where employment is often informal and volatile, household members cannot perfectly observe each other's income. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I present novel empirical evidence that individuals hide employment income from other household members. Using both field survey data collected in western Kenya and a nationally representative dataset in Indonesia, I find that workers hide up to 20% of their employment income from other household members.I develop a model of strategic hidden income that explains why intrahousehold hidden income can persist in a Nash equilibrium. The key feature of the model is that each member of the household can strategically underreport income, increasing private consumption at the expense of household efficiency. hiding may come at a utility cost, but it allows workers to consume more private goods than otherwise, that is, by engaging in intrahousehold bargaining. In equilibrium, cooperation is endogenous and may be incomplete, as household members collectively allocate reported income, but total income is not allocated efficiently. Empirical tests reject collective rationality and support partial income pooling, which is consistent with strategic hidden income.Hiding is not only large in magnitude, but it is also economically significant. In Kenya and Indonesia, households with measured income hiding consume more private goods (such as tobacco and transfers to extended family) and spend less on groceries. In Indonesia, children in households with measured hidden income consume less protein-rich foods and are more likely to be underweight for their age. However, this effect only manifests when the income is hidden from the wife.These children continue to fare worse as adults, as they are more likely to be underweight (girls) and less likely to be employed (boys). In contrast, income hidden from the husband is not correlated with worse child outcomes.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Husbands.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Scandals.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Wives.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Households.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Decision making.

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

Stanford University.

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-04A.

Host Item Entry  

Dissertation Abstract International

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:643566