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Essays in the Economics of Health Insurance- [electronic resource]
Essays in the Economics of Health Insurance- [electronic resource]
- 자료유형
- 학위논문
- Control Number
- 0016933250
- International Standard Book Number
- 9798379692858
- Dewey Decimal Classification Number
- 362.1
- Main Entry-Personal Name
- Serna Borrero, Natalia.
- Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint
- [S.l.] : The University of Wisconsin - Madison., 2023
- Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023
- Physical Description
- 1 online resource(212 p.)
- General Note
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.
- General Note
- Advisor: Sorensen, Alan T.
- Dissertation Note
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2023.
- Restrictions on Access Note
- This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
- Summary, Etc.
- 요약Rising health care costs motivate the use of demand- and supply-side mechanisms to control the consumption of health services, and generate incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection strategies. Using data from the Colombian health care system, I first measure how demand for different health services responds to cost-sharing using a regression discontinuity design. I then study how cost-sharing impacts negotiated service prices between insurers and hospitals using a model of Nash-in-Nash bargaining. Finally, I quantify the impact of risk selection incentives on hospital network breadth using a model of insurer competition in networks. I find that cost-sharing is effective at reducing health care costs, but that consumption reductions happen across necessary and unnecessary services. Counterfactual simulations show that negotiated hospital prices are U-shaped with respect to the coinsurance rate, and minimized at a coinsurance rate of 30 percent. Findings of the model of insurer competition in networks show that insurers engage in risk selection by providing narrow networks. Improving the risk adjustment formula reduces selection incentives and motivates insurers to expand their networks in every health service. Allowing insurers to compete on premiums and networks, shows that price and non-price characteristics of insurance contracts are substitute mechanisms for risk selection.
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Health care management.
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Health sciences.
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Cost sharing
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Health insurance
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Hospital networks
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Risk adjustment
- Added Entry-Corporate Name
- The University of Wisconsin - Madison Economics
- Host Item Entry
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 84-12B.
- Host Item Entry
- Dissertation Abstract International
- Electronic Location and Access
- 로그인을 한후 보실 수 있는 자료입니다.
- Control Number
- joongbu:642875
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