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Three Essays on the Political Economy of Organized Crime- [electronic resource]
Three Essays on the Political Economy of Organized Crime- [electronic resource]
- 자료유형
- 학위논문
- Control Number
- 0016931602
- International Standard Book Number
- 9798379774448
- Dewey Decimal Classification Number
- 320
- Main Entry-Personal Name
- Castillo-Quintana, Martin.
- Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint
- [S.l.] : New York University., 2023
- Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023
- Physical Description
- 1 online resource(169 p.)
- General Note
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-01, Section: A.
- General Note
- Advisor: Hafer, Catherine.
- Dissertation Note
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2023.
- Restrictions on Access Note
- This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
- Summary, Etc.
- 요약This dissertation investigates the complex relationships and strategic interactions between governments, criminal organizations, and policy-making in electoral contexts. The study comprises three interconnected essays that address crucial questions concerning the control of drug trafficking-related violence, the impact of enforcement policies on organized criminal groups, and the mechanisms through which criminal organizations capture politicians and shape electoral outcomes.The first essay examines the conditions under which governments can indirectly control drug trafficking-related violence by implementing conditional policies. A dynamic game with endogenous discounting is developed, capturing the strategic interaction between a government and two rival drug lords. The model illustrates the limitations governments face in credibly threatening drug lords and explores the interactions between violence, corruption, foreign aid, and the legalization of illicit drug markets.The second essay investigates the effects of enforcement policies against organized criminal groups on security and violence. Contrary to existing theories, a dynamic model is proposed that accounts for information asymmetries in criminal wars, demonstrating that states can reduce violence by not targeting the most violent criminal groups. Furthermore, the model is embedded into a framework of electoral accountability to explore how electoral incentives shape enforcement policies against organized criminal groups.The third essay delves into the determinants and strategies employed by criminal organizations to capture politicians and influence policy-making in electoral contexts. A formal model is developed to identify the conditions under which criminal groups adopt different strategies and to analyze the mechanisms by which these strategies impact voter turnout and electoral competitiveness.Together, these essays provide novel insights into the strategic interactions between governments, criminal organizations, and policy-making in electoral contexts, advancing our understanding of the challenges and opportunities in tackling organized crime and violence.
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Political science.
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Public administration.
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Criminology.
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Conflict
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Electoral accountability
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Enforcement policies
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Formal theory
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- Organized crime
- Index Term-Uncontrolled
- War on drugs
- Added Entry-Corporate Name
- New York University Politics
- Host Item Entry
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-01A.
- Host Item Entry
- Dissertation Abstract International
- Electronic Location and Access
- 로그인을 한후 보실 수 있는 자료입니다.
- Control Number
- joongbu:642690