자료유형  

 학위논문

Control Number  

0016934079

International Standard Book Number  

9798379919276

Dewey Decimal Classification Number  

110

Main Entry-Personal Name  

Taskin, Zeyneb Betul.

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

[S.l.] : Indiana University., 2023

Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023

Physical Description  

1 online resource(174 p.)

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-01, Section: A.

General Note  

Advisor: Walbridge, John;O'Connor, Timothy.

Dissertation Note  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2023.

Restrictions on Access Note  

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Summary, Etc.  

요약This dissertation argues that occasionalism offers the most adequate account of God's providential control over created reality. It argues first that occasionalism explains God's relation to secondary causality better than the rival theistic theories, mere conservationism and concurrentism, for two reasons: It offers the strongest construal of divine providence, and it explains secondary causality better than the other theories. It then rebuts two objections to occasionalism. The first objection contends that if God's causal activity surrounds human acts, their acts cannot be free in the libertarian sense. Two thoroughgoing occasionalist solutions to this problem are examined: Ṣadr al-Shariʿa's theory of kasb and Malebranche's consent. It is conceded that these theories do not satisfy the conditions of libertarian free will, because human beings do not, on these accounts, make a real causal contribution to their acts. On the other hand, a third approach, partial occasionalism, is compatible with libertarian free will, because it allows that human beings causally contribute to their own acts. A specific version of this approach, ''minimalist partial occasionalism,'' is here defended. This theory restricts a person's causal contribution to causing their acts of will alone. This minimality permits a strong notion of divine providence and God's creation of secondary causality, while at the same time it meets the conditions of libertarianism. The second objection to occasionalism is that on it, even if human beings cause their act of will, God would still be morally responsible for creating the evil acts of human agents. A full response to this challenge (closely related to the problem of evil) is not here offered. But it is argued that the challenge is not more difficult for occasionalism than it is for other theistic theories to defeat this problem.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Metaphysics.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Islamic studies.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Philosophy of religion.

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Occasionalism

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Libertarian sense

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Theistic theories

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Libertarianism

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Human beings

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

Indiana University Middle Eastern Languages and Cultures

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-01A.

Host Item Entry  

Dissertation Abstract International

Electronic Location and Access  

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Control Number  

joongbu:642363