Material Type  

 학위논문

 

0016935051

Date and Time of Latest Transaction  

20240214101847

ISBN  

9798380847926

DDC  

320

Author  

Murtaza, Natasha.

Title/Author  

Intrastate Politics: How Political Parties and the State Shape Each Other - [electronic resource]

Publish Info  

[S.l.] : Harvard University., 2023

Publish Info  

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023

Material Info  

1 online resource(136 p.)

General Note  

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-05, Section: A.

General Note  

Advisor: Cammett, Melani;Levitsky, Steven.

학위논문주기  

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2023.

Restrictions on Access Note  

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Abstracts/Etc  

요약My dissertation focuses on the interplay between political parties and the state. When do governments invest in building impartial and effective state institutions? How does the extraction of state resources and rents by politicians affect party building and political development? Why might the interaction between parties and the state shape regime type and determine regime stability? I employ a diverse range of methods to study these questions, from digitizing archival publications and web scraping government records for statistical analysis to interviews and participant observation.Weak and decrepit states are an endemic problem in the Global South. Effective state institutions are critical for development in these low and middle-income countries. Yet, we still do not understand enough about when and how these state structures are built up or reformed. The conventional wisdom states that electoral competition leads to state-building (Geddes 1994, O'Dwyer 2006, Gryzmala-Busse 2007). The first paper shows that contra to much of the existing literature, electoral competition undermines, rather than encourages, state-building. I argue that competitive elections lead politicians to have short time horizons. Politicians rely on state rents and resources to fund their electoral campaigns in electoral democracies in the developing world. Electoral competition creates perverse incentives that encourage political interference in day-to-day administration to access the spoils of office. The consequent politicization of state institutions erodes bureaucratic capacity as governments prioritize their organizational imperatives over the needs of the state.Counterintuitively, I argue that dominant parties are more likely to invest in improving state capacity. Dominant parties have longer time horizons since they anticipate remaining in office for the foreseeable future. These parties view the state as an effective tool through which to implement their agenda, which can be developmental or exclusionary. The insulation of the bureaucracy by the party removes politics from administration, which improves the effectiveness of state institutions. I test this argument in India with an original dataset on the postings of Indian Administrative Service officers. Longitudinal data from 1953 to 2019 on the national and subnational levels show that competitive elections increase political interference in the bureaucracy, while single-party dominance results in the opposite. Qualitative archival data and interviews provide evidence for the causal mechanism, demonstrating that this rent-seeking behavior is politically motivated and negatively impacts bureaucratic capacity.The second paper examines where strong parties come from and why weak parties persist in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). I investigate why governing parties in Arab Republics have remained weak compared to their Islamist opposition and the impact of this disparity on regime transitions in the MENA region. Through a medium-N case analysis, I show that regime parties fragmented following the Arab uprisings due to their dependence on state-funded patronage networks. In contrast, the Islamist opposition proved resilient due to the networks they built in society when deprived of access to the state. This imbalanced party system foreclosed the possibility of negotiated or 'pacted' transitions that proved to be successful in Western Europe and Latin America.The third paper centers on the important, but understudied, topic of political parties and militaries. The civil-military relations literature focuses on the military part of this relationship, finding that certain types of militaries are prone to interfere in civilian governance. In a co-authored paper with Daniel K. Baissa (Harvard University), we argue that the civilian state and political parties are critical in shaping military strategy. We find that the relationship between the military and civilian governments structures politics and determines coup propensity. Through Cox Proportional Hazards models, we show that state and party strength better predict the likelihood of a military coup than established indicators of military strength. These findings underline the importance of theorizing about the civil part of civil-military relations by incorporating insights from studies on political institutions.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Political science.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Public administration.

Subject Added Entry-Topical Term  

Military studies.

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Bureaucratic politics

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Civil-military relations

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Developing democracies

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Electoral competition

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

Political parties

Index Term-Uncontrolled  

State-building

Added Entry-Corporate Name  

Harvard University Government

Host Item Entry  

Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-05A.

Host Item Entry  

Dissertation Abstract International

Electronic Location and Access  

로그인을 한후 보실 수 있는 자료입니다.

소장사항  

202402 2024

Control Number  

joongbu:640802