서브메뉴
검색
The Web of Questions: Inquisitive Decision Theory and the Bounds of Rationality
The Web of Questions: Inquisitive Decision Theory and the Bounds of Rationality
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문
- Control Number
- 0015493031
- International Standard Book Number
- 9781392370568
- Dewey Decimal Classification Number
- 401
- Main Entry-Personal Name
- Hoek, Daniel.
- Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint
- [Sl] : New York University, 2019
- Publication, Distribution, etc. (Imprint
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019
- Physical Description
- 247 p
- General Note
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.
- General Note
- Advisor: Dorr, Cian.
- Dissertation Note
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2019.
- Restrictions on Access Note
- This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
- Restrictions on Access Note
- This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
- Summary, Etc.
- 요약Something important is missing from the standard account of the connection between belief and action. The way a given belief should be expected to manifest itself in action is not a function of its informational content, but also depends systematically on the question that the belief answers. This dissertation articulates that dependence with a simple new theory of belief-guided action, explaining a range of ordinary patterns of behaviour that cannot be accounted for given the standard account of belief, desire and action. The appeal to questions is especially fruitful when it comes to explaining behaviour that displays some inconsistency, or which is less than ideally rational. I call this new account of belief and action inquisitive decision theory.Besides providing a new model for less than ideally rational behaviour, the inquisitive account of belief also suggests new ways of thinking about deductive reasoning and deliberation, and throws new light on certain long-standing issues in doxastic logic. It brings together a converging set of recent insights about the role of questions in cognition stemming from epistemology, the philosophy of language, the metaphysics of propositions, linguistic semantics, formal pragmatics and psychology. In addition, it builds on work in decision theory, computer science, behavioural economics and the philosophy of mathematics.
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Philosophy
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Economics
- Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
- Linguistics
- Added Entry-Corporate Name
- New York University Philosophy
- Host Item Entry
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 81-05A.
- Host Item Entry
- Dissertation Abstract International
- Electronic Location and Access
- 로그인을 한후 보실 수 있는 자료입니다.
- Control Number
- joongbu:569727
MARC
008200131s2019 c eng d■001000015493031
■00520200217181928
■020 ▼a9781392370568
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI22587811
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a401
■1001 ▼aHoek, Daniel.
■24514▼aThe Web of Questions: Inquisitive Decision Theory and the Bounds of Rationality
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bNew York University▼c2019
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2019
■300 ▼a247 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Dorr, Cian.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2019.
■506 ▼aThis item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
■506 ▼aThis item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
■520 ▼aSomething important is missing from the standard account of the connection between belief and action. The way a given belief should be expected to manifest itself in action is not a function of its informational content, but also depends systematically on the question that the belief answers. This dissertation articulates that dependence with a simple new theory of belief-guided action, explaining a range of ordinary patterns of behaviour that cannot be accounted for given the standard account of belief, desire and action. The appeal to questions is especially fruitful when it comes to explaining behaviour that displays some inconsistency, or which is less than ideally rational. I call this new account of belief and action inquisitive decision theory.Besides providing a new model for less than ideally rational behaviour, the inquisitive account of belief also suggests new ways of thinking about deductive reasoning and deliberation, and throws new light on certain long-standing issues in doxastic logic. It brings together a converging set of recent insights about the role of questions in cognition stemming from epistemology, the philosophy of language, the metaphysics of propositions, linguistic semantics, formal pragmatics and psychology. In addition, it builds on work in decision theory, computer science, behavioural economics and the philosophy of mathematics.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0146.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aEconomics
■650 4▼aLinguistics
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0290
■71020▼aNew York University▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g81-05A.
■773 ▼tDissertation Abstract International
■790 ▼a0146
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2019
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15493031▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
■980 ▼a202002▼f2020
